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Abstract 
The goal of this research was to investigate the controversy surrounding the inability of SFAS 133 an amendment of 
SFAS 161 to portray the economics of hedging. This research examined whether or not BHCs’ design of hedge 
effectiveness tests was determined by the concern of the additional earnings volatility possibly evolved from 
economic hedges that do not qualify for hedge accounting. The results implicate that most BHCs after the 
amendment of SFAS 161 reassessed their risk management approach to one that is more accounting responsive to 
ensure that most hedges are highly effective to qualify for hedge accounting. The findings suggest that BHCs 
reciprocate between risk management and earnings volatility when face a trade-off between employ economic 
hedges which increase earnings volatility and discontinue economic hedges to avoid increases in earnings volatility. 
The results accede with the results of Park (2004), Singh (2008), Zhang (2008), Hariom (2014), Bratten (2016), 
Spencer (2018), and Thomas (2018) who found that derivative users had lower levels of earnings volatility after the 
introduction of SFAS 161. 
Keywords: derivatives, accounting for derivatives and hedging activities, economic hedges, fair value hedges, cash 
flow hedges, SFAS 133, corporate risk management, earnings volatility, earnings smoothing 
1. Introduction 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in an attempt to restore the confiden ce of investors and 
corporations in the financial markets as a result of the increased restatements of 10Ks attributable to errors 
in derivatives and hedging activities reporting, introduced FASB Statement No. 161, “Disclosures about 
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities—an amendment of FASB Statement No. 133”, (Issue Date 
03/08). Hariom, Spencer, and Swaminathan (2014) used the derivative disclosures required by SFAS 161 to 
examine whether the economic consequences and investors’ reactions to derivative use vary by the 
accounting designation firms use for their derivatives and found that hedge designated derivatives are 
negatively associated with several measures of firm risk, suggesting that the accounting designation of these 
derivatives captures the intended economic use of these derivatives.  Thomas (2018) investigated whether 
changes in derivative and hedging footnote disclosures required by SFAS 161 affected investor uncertainty 
and found that uncertainty (measured as the bid-ask spread) is reduced mostly for firms whose disclosures 
are more affected by SFAS 161.  Campbell, Khan, and Pierce (2017) examined whether SFAS’s 161 
enhanced mandatory derivatives disclosures improved users’ understanding of firms’ hedging activities, and 
suggested that enhanced mandatory derivative disclosures helped correct investors’ understanding of the 
implication of unrealized cash flow hedge gains/losses for future firm performance.  
In the early 2000s, major financial institutions restated their financial statements  due to the enormous 
inconsistencies in the corporate implementations of SFAS 133.  Bratten, Causholli, and Khan (2016) showed 
that fair value adjustments recorded in OCI during the 2007–2009 financial crisis predicted future 
profitability, contradicting criticism that fair value accounting forced banks to record excessive downward 
adjustments. The restatements related to the implementation of hedge accounting under SFAS 133 ascended 
greatly since 2003 from 514 to about 1,200 corporations in 2005 (Corman,2006). Major financial 
institutions such as the Bank of America (Note 1), Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Banks of Dallas, 
Atlanta and Indianapolis reviewed the accounting treatment for all derivative transactions used as hedges 
and restated their historical financial statements for the years 2001-2006 since certain transactions did not 
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meet strict requirements of the "short cut" method of accounting under SFAS 133. The FASB in response to 
the increased number of restatements issued in 2007 a proposal to  clarify the “Shortcut Method” of hedge 
accounting: The shortcut method endorses certain preconditions that must be convened for a company to 
assure that certain hedging relationships of interest rate risk would ensue in no ineffectiveness. Using the 
shortcut method immensely decreases the required calculations implicated in hedge accounting, as it feigns 
that the change in value of an interest swap is a "perfect proxy" for the change in value of the hedged item, 
thereby resulting in no income statement volatility or "ineffectiveness" (FASB News Release, 07/24/07).  In 
the accounting literature Barnes (2001), Park (2004), Bhamornsiri & Schroeder (2004), and Singh (2008) affirmed 
that the effects of derivatives and hedging activities were not clear in the financial statements since the gains and 
losses on those derivatives recognized in financial statements “were deferred from earnings recognition and reported 
as part of the carrying amount of a related item or as if they were freestanding assets and liabilities” (SFAS 133, 
2008, para. 234, p. 106).  
Makar, Wang, and Alam (2013) supported the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s concern that the 
SFAS 133 mixed attribute model does not provide the information necessary for investors to understand the 
net economic effects of derivatives use. The current disclosure requirements in Statement 133 have been 
criticized for not delivering sufficient information on how derivative and hedging activities affect an entity’s 
financial position, financial performance, and cash flows. Constituents state that under the existing 
disclosure requirements, it is often difficult to ascertain where and in what amounts derivative instruments 
and their gains and losses are recorded in the statement of financial position and in the statement of 
financial performance (SFAS 161, A27). Khan, Li, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam ( 2018) examined the 
cost-effectiveness of the accounting standards issued by the FASB during 1973–2009 from the shareholders' 
perspective by evaluating the market reactions in relation to agency problems, information asymmetry, 
proprietary costs, contracting costs, and changes in estimation risk and found that firms with higher levels 
of information asymmetry, lower contracting costs, and a decrease in estimation risk experience most 
positive returns. 
SFAS 133 as the primary directive for the accounting treatment of derivative instruments in the United 
States requires all entities to disclose information about the in terest rate, foreign exchange rate, and credit 
risk exposures hedged with derivative instruments. Statement 133 constrains financial institutions to 
distinguish between derivative instruments designated as hedges used for corporate risk management 
purposes such as fair value hedges and cash flow hedges and derivative instruments used to hedge economic 
risks such as economic hedges (SFAS133, 2008, para. 44). One of the most disputable issues in corporate 
risk management is the proper accounting treatment of hedging activities under SFAS 133. Hedges often 
generate cash losses and gains, while the transactions they are designed to hedge generate only paper gains 
and losses (Chance & Brooks, 2007). If the derivative gains and losses are not reported in the state ment of 
financial position in unison with the gains and losses of the hedged transactions, the earnings in the income 
statement would appear increasingly volatile. Spencer (2018) found evidence that firm value has a positive 
association with the use of hedge accounting and the resulting decrease in earnings volatility.  
Hedge accounting reduces earnings volatility by minimizing the potential income statement effect of the risk 
that is being hedged, since it causes the derivative gains or losses to influence revenues in the period 
corresponding to the gain or loss consequential to the risk being hedged. The alternative to hedge 
accounting that is applied to economic or speculative hedges that do not qualify for hedge accounting is to 
recognize fluctuations in the recorded fair value of derivative hedging instruments immediately in earnings 
causing the earnings to appear redundantly volatile. The leading purpose of hedging is to diminish erratic 
earnings changes since earnings volatility and negative earnings surprises are frequently scrutinized by 
investors and analysts as a warning of unsuccessful company management. Smooth and predictable earnings 
trends are approvingly prospected by investors and analysts and augment the repute of a competent company 
management. A hedging policy that curtails inconsistent earnings changes can be advantageous for both 
directors and the stockholders of a company (Tromblem, 2003). The hedging accounting rules of SFAS 133 
lead to ominous earnings volatility which makes the decision to hedge anchored in the company’s 
willingness to accept or not the likelihood of earnings volatility (Kolbasovsky, 2009; Hughen, 2010; 
Kolbasovsky, 2009; Sigrist, 2008; Trombley, 2003).  Spencer specifically (2018) found that the use of hedge 
accounting is pervasive and that firms’ use of hedge accounting is associated with not only the economic 
motives behind the derivative use, but also the costs and benefits specific to implementing hedge 
accounting. The author concluded that firms significantly decrease earnings volatility via hedge accounting.  
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This study extends the corporate risk management behavior of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) in the 
framework of SFAS 133 as amended by SFAS 161 in 2008, by investigating BHCs’ hedging activities to find 
possible differences in earnings volatility related to the timing of the amount of gains and losses recognized 
in income on derivative hedging instruments for accounting versus economic hedgers (SFAS 133, 2008, 
para. 17-35). To determine whether or not BHCs reassessed their corporate risk management approach, 
BHCs were classified as either SFAS161- Accounting Hedgers, or SFAS161- Compliant Hedgers.  BHCs 
are classified as SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers when they use only derivatives qualifying for hedge 
accounting under SFAS 161 comprising those instruments designated as fair value and cash flow hedges. 
Alternatively, BHCs are classified as SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers when they use both derivative 
instruments designated as fair value and cash flow hedges under SFAS 161 and  economic hedges that do not 
qualify for hedge accounting under SFAS 161.The focus of this research is on BHCs since the derivatives 
market activity in the United States is monopolized by the five largest BHCs, which constitute 97% of the 
total notional derivative contracts (OCC, 2009). Also, the banking industry is at the center of the dispute 
over the relative benefits of fair-value based income measures because banks’ balance sheets are comprised 
almost entirely of financial instruments (Hodder, Hopkins,  & Wahlen, 2006). 
2. Hedge Accounting and Earnings Volatility under SFAS 161 
SFAS 133 requires all derivatives to be reported on the statement of financial position at fair value as either 
assets or liabilities. Fair value is based on published stock prices or on pricing models or discounted cash 
flow estimates when stock prices are not published. Under Statement 133 the gains or losses derived from 
changes in the fair value of a derivative hinge on whether the derivative has been designated as a hedging 
instrument and is in a qualifying hedging relationship (SFAS161, 205D). For a derivative designated as 
hedging the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognized asset, liability or a firm commitment the 
gain or loss is recognized in earnings in the period of change together with the offsetting loss or gain on the 
hedged item attributable to the risk being hedged. The effect of that accounting is to reflect in earnings the 
extent to which the hedge is effective or not in achieving offsetting changes in  fair value (SFAS 133, 
para.18). Since, the main purpose of hedging is to protect the income statement from the effect of adverse 
changes in prices, interest rates, or currency exchange rates, companies would like to use derivative 
instruments that qualify for hedge accounting to cause the gain or loss from the derivative to impact 
earnings in the same period as the gain or loss resulting from the risk being hedged.  
The FASB’s decision to eliminate the ability to hedge by risk and require entities to assess effectiveness based upon 
total change in fair value of a hedged item/transaction considerably influences companies’ most common hedging 
strategies since derivatives are usually designated to hedge certain risks and hedging all risks might not be a practical 
alternative (Sigrist, 2008). The Board supported that “some characteristics of risk management are arduous to 
differentiate from speculation or position-taking and those speculative activities should not be afforded special 
accounting” (SFAS133, 2008, para. 352, p. 128). SFAS 133 allows firms to apply hedge accounting and defer on 
income any gains (losses) from changes in the fair value of derivative instruments designed as hedges  after the 
completion of the hedge (SFAS 133, 2008, para. 363). To meet the requirements of hedge accounting the fair value 
variations of derivative instruments must neutralize the fair value or cash flow variations of the hedged 
item/transaction (SFAS 133, 2008, para. 21). 
Economic or speculative hedges do not qualify for hedge accounting and they have to recognize fluctuations 
in the recorded fair value of derivative hedging instruments immediately in earnings. The approach of 
accelerating the earnings recognition of economic or speculative hedges that do not qualify for hedge accounting 
reproduces unrepresentative earnings volatility. Frestad and Beisland (2015) argued that SFAS 133 hedge 
effectiveness is not a trustworthy indication of a speculative constituent in a derivative portfolio so the ‘‘highly 
effective’’ hedge assessment cannot efficiently distinct economic or speculative hedges from derivative portfolios. 
Nan (2007) showed through a specific agency model that the early recognition of the use of derivatives who do not 
qualify for hedge accounting may change the risk allocation in the manager’s compensation and motivate 
speculation.  
Contributing to the corporate risk management literature Suh (2007) argued that the hedging disclosures of SFAS 
133 did not provide a clear picture of whether companies’ earnings volatility intensifications originated from 
speculative hedges or from economic hedges. Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (2007) disputed that information available 
in the financial statements regarding companies’ corporate hedging risk with derivatives was insufficient to provide 
investors with the speculating notion of the company. Sigrist (2008) contested that hedge accounting is not reflective 
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of the way companies manage risk and produces misleading financial statements results since companies who do not 
qualify for hedge accounting would include in the income statement fair value fluctuations for risks not hedged 
distorting earnings and concealing their intended risk management strategy.  
Allayannis, Rountree, and Weston (2008) documented that financial statement volatility is costly and directly affects 
a firm’s value. Trombey (2003) in the same spirit attested that most financial institutions attempt to decrease earning 
volatility with hedging since negative earnings surprises signal an incompetent corporate risk management and are 
viewed negatively by investors and analysts. Wang (2005) documented that, although bad and good earnings news 
(as measured by the square of standardized unexpected earnings [SUE] increased future return volatility, bad 
earnings news raised future volatility more than good earnings news did. Empirical accounting researchers found 
that after the implementation of SFAS 133 derivatives users had lower levels of earnings volatility and 
higher levels of income smoothing proposing that SFAS 133 may have driven companies’ earnings 
management decisions (Singh, 2008; Park, 2004; Zhang, 2009; Zhou, 2009).   
3. Hypothesis Development  
SFAS 133 hedge effectiveness protects the income statement from any volatility instigated from variations in the 
derivatives interest rate, foreign exchange rate, and credit risk underlying. Hedge accounting equalizes the gains and 
losses on the derivative instrument and the hedged item syncing them in earnings in the same accounting period and 
only the hedge ineffectiveness between the gains and losses on the derivative instrument and the hedged item are 
reported directly in income causing adverse volatility. In the existing accounting literature Singh (2008), Park (2004), 
Zhang (2009), Beneda (2013), and Drakopoulou (2015) recognized that after the original pronouncement of SFAS 133, 
derivatives users had lower levels of earnings volatility. Beneda (2013) found a strong association between the low 
reported earnings volatility and the firm use of derivative instruments for hedging. Drakopoulou (2015) originated that 
bank holding companies (BHCs) which increased the level of accounting hedges and decreased the level of economic 
hedges experienced a significant decrease in earnings volatility relative to pre-SFAS 133. Hughen (2010) examined a 
sample of firms that restated previously issued financial statements due to errors in hedge accounting and found that 25% 
of firms qualified for SFAS 133 hedge accounting succeeding the restatement maintaining the stability of accounting 
earnings while 75% of firms did not qualify for hedge accounting after the restatement since they focused on economic 
earnings. 
While the effects of SFAS 133 on earnings volatility is of pertinent concern, Zhang (2008) indicated the importance 
of disaffiliating the effects of SFAS 133 on BHCs corporate risk management behavior and immediate earnings 
volatility while making the presumption that BHCs did not adopt an accounting responsive risk management  
strategy. Zhang (2008) came to the conclusion, that after the implementation of SFAS 133, financial analysts would 
not detect any additional earnings volatility if BHCs felt that any additional earnings volatility would be detrimental 
and material and attuned their derivatives contracts in anticipation of these detriments. Singh (2008) concluded that, 
after the original pronouncement of SFAS 133, the intensification given to hedging and smoothing conferred 
managers’ intentions to avoid increases in earnings volatility through earnings smoothing. Park (2004) argued that 
BHCs either overstated the impact of SFAS 133 on earnings volatility to ease the formation of SFAS 133 or they 
already had attuned their hedging strategies in expectancy of earnings volatility amplifications. Park’s (2004) tests of 
earnings volatility showed that the “three income-affecting sources (TIPs) (i.e., ineffective hedge gains/losses, 
gains/losses excluded in hedge assessment, and effects from cancelled forecasted transactions previously designed as 
cash flow hedges)” (p. 15) arisen from SFAS 133 did not increase earnings volatility and concluded that variations in 
the fair value of derivative instruments not qualifying for hedge accounting might had an effect on earnings volatility 
increases. 
Therefore, to determine whether some BHCs adjusted their corporate risk management strategy to one that is more 
accounting responsive to achieve a decrease in earnings volatility, the following research question and associated 
hypothesis is proposed: 
Did BHCs that increased their level of SFAS161-Accounting Hedges and decreased their level of 
SFAS161-Economic Hedges in response to the new accounting standard experience a significant decrease in earnings 
volatility relative to pre-SFAS 133? 
H1: There was no difference in earnings volatility for SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers and SFAS161-Accounting 
Hedgers after the 2008 amendment of SFAS 133. 
H1a: There was a difference in earnings volatility for SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers and SFAS161-Accounting 
Hedgers after the 2008 amendment of SFAS 133. 
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4. Sample, Research Method, and Results 
The derivatives market in the United States is controlled by the five largest BHCs which represent 97% of the total 
financial industry’s notional amount of derivatives (OCC, 2009). The primary data examined in this study are for U.S. 
BHCs in Peer 1 and Peer 2 Groups with total assets greater than $10 and $3 billion respectively. The data for the 
derivative instruments and hedging activities of the sampled BHCs were collected from their annual financial 
statements (10Ks) found in the Edgar Filing System of the SEC by using the open full reader search and keyword 
searches such as notional, cash flow hedges, fair value hedges, economic hedges, derivatives, and SFAS 133 from 
fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2009. The years 2008 and 2009 were selected because SFAS No. 133 was amended in 
2008 by SFAS 161 (Issue Date 03/08) changing the disclosures about derivative instruments and hedging activities. 
In the BHCs official website under investor relations, data for the CEOs stock option-based compensation were 
retrieved from the BHCs proxy statements, while data on the number of analysts following the company were 
retrieved under analyst coverage. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
SFAS 133 requires entities to recognize all of its derivative instruments in its statement of financial position as either 
assets or liabilities depending on the rights or obligations under the contracts. All derivative instruments shall be 
measured at fair value (SFAS 133, para.17). The accounting for changes in the fair value (that is, gains or losses) of a 
derivative depends on whether it has been designated and qualifies as part of a hedging relationship and, if so, on the 
reason for holding it. Gains and losses on derivative instruments are accounted for as follows: (a). Economic hedge: 
The gain or loss on a derivative instrument not designated as a hedging instrument shall be recognized currently in 
earnings; (b). Fair value hedge: The gain or loss on a derivative instrument designated and qualifying as a fair value 
hedging instrument as well as the offsetting loss or gain on the hedged item attributable to the hedged risk shall be 
recognized currently in earnings in the same accounting period; and (c). Cash flow hedge: The effective portion of 
the gain or loss on a derivative designated as a cash flow hedge is reported in other comprehensive income and 
reclassified into earnings in the same period or periods during which the hedged forecasted transaction affects 
earnings while the ineffective portion is reported in earnings (SFAS 133, para.18 & 30).  
This study extends the corporate risk management behavior of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) in the framework 
of SFAS 133 as amended by SFAS 161 in 2008, by investigating BHCs’ hedging activities to find possible 
differences in earnings volatility related to the timing of the amount of gains and losses recognized in income on 
derivative hedging instruments for Accounting versus Economic Hedgers.  The hedging activities of 
SFAS161-Compliant and Accounting Hedgers were researched to investigate whether BHCs manipulated the 
differential treatment of the changes in the fair value of derivatives designated as hedging instruments (cash flow 
hedges, fair value hedges, and economic hedges) to smooth earnings and decrease earnings volatility in an attempt to 
increase the intrinsic value of their stock. Descriptive statistics for the 2008 and 2009 classification of hedging 
instruments designated as Cash Flow Hedges, Fair Value Hedges, and Economic Hedges is presented in Table 1 for 
SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers including the timing of recognition in income of the gains and losses on hedging 
instruments and the reported ineffectiveness in hedging relationships for accounting vs. economic hedges.  
For SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers the results in Table 1 suggest that for cash flow hedging instruments, the 2009 
amount of (a) gain recognized in OCI on derivative (M = 3.16, SD= 2.85), (b) gain recognized from AOCI into 
income (M = 2.12, SD = 1.20), and (c) gain reclassified in income on derivative (ineffective portion) (M = 2.04, SD 
= 1.65), were higher than the 2008 amount of (a) loss recognized in OCI on derivative (M = -3.60, SD = 1.68), (b) 
loss recognized from AOCI into income (M = -3.07, SD = 1.07), and (c) loss reclassified in income on derivative 
(ineffective portion) (M = -8.71, SD = 6.73). For fair value hedging instruments the results suggest that the 2009 
amount of (a) gain recognized in income on derivative (M = 1.98, SD = 2.68), and (b) loss recognized in income on 
derivative (ineffective portion) (M = -6.02, SD = 5.16), were lower than the 2008 amount of (a) gain recognized in 
income on derivative (M = 7.80, SD = 3.32), and (b) loss recognized in income on derivative (ineffective portion) (M 
= -9.20, SD = 2.28). For economic hedges the results suggest that the 2009 amount of (a) gain recognized in income 
on derivative (M = 3.08, SD = 9.89), were lower than the 2008 amount of (a) gain recognized in income on 
derivative (M = 8.00, SD = 2.31).  
The results in Table 1 show that for cash flow hedges the ineffective portion of the amount of gain (loss) recognized 
in income on derivatives for 2009 is a gain of 0.20 million while for 2008 is a loss of -0.87 million. For fair value 
hedges the ineffective portion of the amount of gain (loss) recognized in income on derivative for 2009 is a loss of 
-0.60 million while for 2008 is a loss of -0.90 million. For economic hedges the amount of gain (loss) recognized in 
income on derivative for 2009 is a gain of 0.30 million while for 2008 is a gain of 0.80 million.  
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SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers adjusted their hedging behavior in 2009 and re-designated their hedges to overstate 
their income with derivatives converging more for the economic benefits of hedging and tormenting less for earnings 
volatility. These results are consistent with Liu, Seow, and Xie’s (2011) findings that SFAS 133 hedge ineffectiveness 
is beneficial for evaluating the corporate risk management activities of BHCs because banks with significant hedge 
ineffectiveness gains or losses are considered riskier since they are exposed to higher variations in interest rates, they 
have a higher credit default risk, and lower return rates. 
Table 1. Descriptive Stats: SFAS161- Compliant Hedgers classification of Hedging Instruments 
 CASH FLOW HEDGES  FAIR VALUE HEDGES  ECONOMIC 
HEDGES 
  
Amount of Gain 
(Loss) 
Recognized in 
OCI on 
Derivative 
 
Amount of Gain 
(Loss) 
Reclassified 
from AOCI into 
Income 
 
Amount of Gain  
(Loss) 
Recognized in 
Income on 
Derivative 
(Ineffective 
Portion) 
  
Amount of Gain 
(Loss) 
Recognized in 
Income on 
Derivative 
 
Amount of Gain  
(Loss) 
Recognized in 
Income on 
Derivative 
(Ineffective 
Portion) 
  
Amount of 
Gain(Loss) 
Recognized in 
Income on Derivative 
  
SFAS 161 Compliant Hedgers 
 2009  2008  2009  2008  2009  2008   2009  2008  2009  2008   2009  2008  
N 24 24 24 24 24 24  14 13 10 9  24 24 
M 3.167 -3.608 2.127 -3.075 2.04 -8.71  1.986 7.080 -6.020 -9.200  2.690 5.990 
SD 2.853 1.689 1.201 1.071 1.65 6.73  2.608 3.320 5.162 2.880  9.892 2.311 
Min -6.915 -3.231 -8.140 -4.542 -3.59 -3.15  5.600 -7.840 -1.052 -8.585  -7.827 -2.991 
Max 8.540 6.013 4.022 9.480 7.03 6.90  7.802 6.800 1.127 1.770  3.620 1.069 
SEM 5.824 3.449 2.451 2.185 3.37 1.37  6.971 9.200 1.632 9.580  2.019 4.718 
Q1 -0.010 -1.735 -1.403 -2.963 -1.00 0.00  2.165 2.450 -3.300 -1.00  -5.435 3.525 
Mdn 0.000 0.000 7.500 0.000 0.00 0.00  5.065 3.430 -5.100 9.00  6.515 2.265 
Q3 3.275 1.950 1.910 1.445 0.25 1.00  3.320 1.68 6.500 5.00  2.307 3.519 
               
For SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers the results in Table 2 suggest that for cash flow hedging instruments the 2009 
amount of (a) gain recognized in OCI on derivative (M = 8.49, SD= 2.89), (b) gain recognized from AOCI into 
income (M = 1.43, SD = 1.19), and (c) gain reclassified in income on derivative (ineffective portion) (M = 2.25, SD 
= 1.05), were higher than the 2008 amount of (a) gain recognized in OCI on derivative (M = 1.07, SD = 3.26), (b) 
gain recognized from AOCI into income (M = 1.03, SD = 1.86), and (c) gain reclassified in income on derivative 
(ineffective portion) (M = 0.24, SD = 1.84). For fair value hedging instruments the results suggest that the 2009 
amount of: (a) gain recognized in income on derivative (M = 9.83, SD = 1.56), were higher than the  2008 amount 
of (a) gain recognized in income on derivative (M = 4.50, SD = 2.61), while the 2009 amount of (b) loss recognized 
in income on derivative (ineffective portion) (M =-2.20, SD = 2.12), were lower than the 2008 amount of (b) gain 
recognized in income on derivative (ineffective portion) (M = 2.40, SD = 6.03). 
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Table 2. Descriptive Stats: SFAS161- Accounting Hedgers classification of Hedging Instruments 
 CASH FLOW HEDGES  FAIR VALUE HEDGES 
 Amount of 
Gain(Loss) 
recognized in OCI 
on Derivative 
Amount of Gain(Loss) 
reclassified from AOCI 
into Income 
Amount of Gain  
(Loss) Recognized 
in Income on 
Derivative 
(Ineffective 
Portion) 
 Amount of Gain 
(Loss) Recognized 
in Income on 
Derivative 
Amount of Gain  
(Loss) Recognized 
in Income on 
Derivative 
(Ineffective 
Portion) 
 
SFAS161- Accounting Hedgers 
 
 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008  2009 2008 2009 2008 
N 38 38 38 38 38 37  18 17 8 8 
M 8.490 1.079 1.438 1.0315 2.254 0.241  9.831 4.506 -2.209 2.400 
SD 2.890 3.265 1.193 1.863 1.056 1.848  1.563 2.610 2.128 6.030 
Min -5.360 -8.512 -3.547 -8.519 -6.200 -9.380  1.330 -3.436 -4.660 -1.200 
Max 8.200 1.752 5.234 5.400 6.010 3.280  5.681 8.202 3.170 1.720 
SEM 4.690 5.297 1.936 3.022 1.712 3.038  3.683 6.331 7.523 2.130 
Q1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  9.560 -2.960 -1.725 1.500 
Mdn 1.940 3.500 1.750 6.250 0.000 0.000  2.415 1.270 -6.000 4.000 
Q3 2.430 3.467 1.985 5.962 0.000 0.100  1.000 6.320 1.248 8.000 
For SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers the descriptive statistics in Table 2 show that for cash flow hedges the ineffective 
portion of the amount of gain (loss) recognized in income on derivative for 2009 is a gain of 0. 22 million while for 
2008 is a gain of 0.24. For fair value hedges the ineffective portion of the amount of gain (loss) recognized in income 
on derivative for 2009 is a loss of -0.22 while for 2008 is a gain of 0.24. SFAS133-accounting hedgers adjusted their 
hedging behavior in 2009 and de-designated their hedges in an attempt to understate earnings volatility by 
discontinuing economic hedges and realizing more desirable accounting results.  
Descriptive statistics in Table 3 posit that there is a significant difference in earnings volatility for 
SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers and SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers in 2009 one year after the 2008 amendment of 
SFAS 133. Earnings volatility is measured by the coefficient of variation of earnings over four quarters before and 
after the 2008 amendment of SFAS 133 (Barnes, 2001; Barton, 2001; Zhang, 2008), and the coefficient of variation 
of earnings is measured as the average standard deviation of the ratio of total earnings before taxes and loan loss 
provisions to average total assets (Laeven et al., 2009). The earnings volatility for  SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers is 
0.46 billion in 2009 and the earnings volatility for SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers is 1.38 billion in 2009, indicating 
that the earnings volatility for SFAS133-Compliant Hedgers is three times higher the earnings volatility for 
SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers. This implies that BHCs who increased the level of accounting hedges and decreased 
or discontinued the level of economic hedges in response to the 2008 amendment of SFAS 133 experienced a 
significant change in earnings volatility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://afr.sciedupress.com Accounting and Finance Research Vol. 7, No. 4; 2018 
Published by Sciedu Press                          129                       ISSN 1927-5986   E-ISSN 1927-5994 
Table 3. Descriptive Stats: Dependent Variable-- EVOL for SFAS161 AHs & CHs 
 SFAS-161 Accounting Hedgers  SFAS-161 Compliant Hedgers 
 EVOL 2009 EVOL 2008  EVOL 2009 EVOL 2008 
      
N 38 38  24 24 
M 0.46 0.80  1.38 1.76 
SD 1.63 2.19  1.77 3.21 
MIN 1.97 1.24  5.20 2.08 
MAX 8.74 1.24  6.97 1.12 
SEM 2.65 3.56  3.62 0.65 
Q1 3.51 3.59  1.56 1.36 
Mdn 7.39 8.15  8.23 5.57 
Q3 1.40 0.34  1.55 1.10 
      
This study by separating the effects of SFAS 161 on earnings volatility and BHCs corporate risk-management 
behavior concluded that the apprehension of earnings volatility caused by economic hedges under SFAS 133 led 
SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers and SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers to adjust their hedging behavior to one that is more 
accounting responsive. As a result of discontinuing economic hedges SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers experienced less 
volatility in earnings, while SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers just by moderating the use of economic hedges 
experienced more volatile earnings. Consistent with the findings of Zhang (2009), Singh (2008), and Park (2004) the 
results of this study show that after the 2008 amendment of SFAS 133 BHCs exhibited a more accounting responsive 
corporate risk management approach in apprehension of the increased earnings volatility caused by economic 
hedges. 
These results are consistent with Zhou’s (2011) findings that the earnings recognition of fair value hedge 
ineffectiveness under SFAS 133 “improves the value and risk relevance of accounting earnings” (p.27) while the 
informational content of the ineffective portion of the gains/losses recognized in income on derivative is higher for 
BHCs since they have more expertise in corporate risk management modus operandi giving them a comparative 
advantage over nonfinancial firms. While the impact of SFAS 133 on earnings volatility has become an increasing 
concern in the accounting literature, Zhang (2008) argued that it is important to disaffiliate the effects of SFAS 133 
on BHCs corporate risk management behavior and earnings volatility assuming that BHCs did not adopt an 
accounting responsive risk management strategy. 
After the original pronouncement of SFAS 133, Zhang (2008) supposed that financial analysts would not detect any 
additional earnings volatility if BHCs felt that any additional earnings volatility would be detrimental and material 
and attuned their derivatives contracts in anticipation of these detriments, while Singh (2008) concluded that the 
intensification given to hedging and smoothing conferred managers’ intention to avoid increases in earnings volatility 
through earnings smoothing. In the same token, Park (2004) argued that BHCs either overstated the impact of SFAS 
133 on earnings volatility to ease the formation of SFAS 133 or they already had attuned their hedging strategies in 
expectancy of earnings volatility amplifications. 
4.2 Paired T-Tests 
This research investigated whether or not there was a difference in earnings volatility for SFAS161-Compliant 
Hedgers and SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers after the 2008 amendment of SFAS 133. A univariate comparison 
between SFAS161- Accounting Hedgers and SFAS161- Compliant Hedgers were performed to test whether or not 
BHCs that increased their level of SFAS161-accounting hedges and decreased their level of SFAS161-economic 
hedges in response to the new accounting standard experienced a significant decrease in earnings volatility relative to 
pre-SFAS 133. Based on the univariate results if the mean value of earnings volatility of SFAS161- compliant 
hedgers is less than or equal to that of SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers (at the alpha = 0.05 level) as determined by a 
one-tailed t-test, then earnings volatility was not due to economic hedges. If the mean value of earnings volatility of 
SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers is higher than SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers, then BHCs earnings volatility resulted 
from economic hedges. 
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To investigate whether or not BHCs that increased their level of SFAS161 accounting hedges and decreased their 
level of economic hedges in response to the 2008 amendment of SFAS 133 experienced a significant change in 
earnings volatility, paired sample t- tests were conducted to compare the mean earnings volatility of 
SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers and SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers. Table 4 provides the t test results of the difference 
between the 2009/2008 mean earnings volatility of the two groups of BHCs. The t- test revealed that there was a 
statistically significant difference between the mean earnings volatility of the two groups, t (60) = 2.09, p ≤.05 
(two-tailed test). The mean earnings volatility of “SFAS161-accounting hedgers” (M=0.46, SD=1.63) was lower than 
the mean earnings volatility of “SFAS161-compliant hedgers” (M=1.38, SD=1.73), hence this is an indication that 
BHCs’ earnings volatility resulted from economic hedges. 
Table 4. Results of t-tests for 2008/2009 EVol, HEDGEINFCASHFLOW, and HEDGEINFFAIRVALUE, ECOHEDGEGain(Loss)  
for AH and CH 
 AH  CH       
Outcome M SD n M SD n 
95% CI for Mean 
Difference 
r t p df 
EVol 0.46 1.63 38 1.38 1.73 24 (.92) .44* 2.09 .049 60 
HEDGEINFCASHFLOW 0.23 1.06 38 0.20 1.65 24 0.272 .37* (.07) .090 35 
HEDGEINFFAIRVALUE (.46) 0.92 38 (.56) 3.94 24 (0.1) .16* (.07) .090 48 
* p ≥ 0.05(two-tailed test). EVol: The average standard deviation of the ratio of total earnings before income taxes and loan loss provisions to 
average total assets. HEDGEINFCASHFLOW: Measures BHCs ineffective portion of the amount of gain (loss) recognized in income on derivatives 
designated as cash flow hedges. HEDGEINFFAIRVALUE: Measures BHCs ineffective portion of the amount of gain (loss) recognized in income on 
derivatives designated as fair value hedges; 
According to the extant accounting literature, income statement earnings volatility is either caused by the cash flow 
hedge ineffectiveness and/or fair value hedge ineffectiveness of SFAS 133 accounting hedges or it is caused by 
economic hedges. To further disentangle the effects of SFAS 133 accounting hedges and economic hedges on 
earnings volatility, a paired sample t test were conducted to compare the mean ineffective amount of the gains (losses) 
recognized in income on derivatives designated as cash flow hedges (HEDGEIN cash flow hedges), fair value 
hedges (HEDGEIN fair value hedges, and economic hedges (NETGains (Losses) for both “SFAS161-Compliant 
Hedgers” and “SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers.”  
Table 5 provides the t test results of the mean difference between the 2009 cash flow hedge ineffectiveness of the two 
groups of BHCs. The t test revealed that there was not a significant difference in the 2009 cash flow hedge 
ineffectiveness of “SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers” (M=0.20, SD=1.65) and “SFAS161-accounting hedgers” (M=0.23, 
SD=1.06), conditions; t(35)= -0.07, p ≥ 0.05 (two-tailed test). 
Table 5. Two-Sample t-test: Difference in Cash Flow Hedge Ineffectiveness between CHs & AHs 
2009 N M SD 
    
SFAS161 Accounting Hedgers (AH) 38 0.23 1.06 
SFAS161 Compliant Hedgers  (CH) 24 0.20 1.65 
    
difference (AH-CH)= 0.272    
standard error of difference =0.37    
t test of difference = H0: µ1 - µ2 =0: t= -0.07,  p= .09,   df=35 
Table 6 provides the t test results of the mean difference between the 2009 fair value hedge ineffectiveness of the two 
groups of BHCs. The t- test revealed that there was not a significant difference in the 2009 fair value hedge 
ineffectiveness of “SFAS161-compliant hedgers” (M= -0.56, SD=3.04) and “SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers” (M= 
-0.46, SD=0.92), conditions; t (48) = -0.06, p ≥0.05 (two-tailed test). 
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Table 6. Two-Sample t-test: Difference in Fair Value Hedge Ineffectiveness between CHs & AHs 
2009 N M SD 
    
SFAS161 Accounting Hedgers (AH) 38 -0.46 0.92 
SFAS161 Compliant Hedgers  (CH) 24 -0.56 3.94 
    
difference (AH-CH)= -0.1    
standard error of difference =0.1631    
t test of difference = H0: µ1 - µ2 =0: t= -0.07,  p= .09,   df=48 
Table 7 provides the t test results of the mean difference between the 2009 and 2008 gains or (losses) recognized by 
SFAS161- compliant hedgers in income on derivative instruments designated as economic hedges. The t test revealed 
that there was a significant difference in the 2009 economic hedges NETGain(Loss) (M= 0.26, SD=0.98) and the 
2008 economic hedges NETGain(Loss) (M= 0.59, SD=2.13) of “SFAS133-compliant hedgers,” conditions; t (33) = 
-0.70, p ≤ 0.05 (two-tailed test).  
Table 7. Two-Sample t-test: 2009/2008 Difference in Economic Hedges Net Gain/(Loss) of CHs 
2009/2008 N M SD 
    
SFAS161 Compliant Hedgers (CH) 25 0.26 0.98 
SFAS161 Compliant Hedgers  (CH) 25 0.59 2.13 
    
difference (CH2009-CH2008)= -0.33    
standard error of difference =0.47    
t test of difference = H0: µ1 - µ2 =0: t= -0.70,  p= .0003,   df=33 
* p ≥ 0.05(two-tailed test). ECOHEDGEGain(Loss) : Measures both realized and unrealized gains and losses recognized in income 
due to changes in fair value of derivatives designated as economic hedges 
The t-test results in Table 5 reveal that the 2009 mean cash flow hedge ineffectiveness is 2.04 million for 
SFAS133-compliant hedgers and 2.31 million for SFAS161-compliant hedgers. There is not a significant difference 
in the cash flow hedge ineffectiveness of SFAS161-compliant hedgers and SFAS161-accounting hedgers since p≥ 
0.05. The t test results in Table 6 reveal that the 2009 mean fair value hedge ineffectiveness is -0.56 million for 
SFAS161-compliant hedgers and -0.46 million for SFAS133-compliant hedgers. There is not a significant difference 
in the fair value hedge ineffectiveness of SFAS161-compliant hedgers and SFAS161-accounting hedgers since p≥ 
0.05. The t test results in Table 7 reveal that the mean amount of gain recognized in income on derivatives designated 
as economic hedges is 0.26 million in 2009 and 0.59 million in 2008 for SFAS161-compliant hedgers. There is a 
significant difference in the 2009 and 2008 amount of economic hedges NETGain (Loss) of SFAS161-compliant 
hedgers since p≤0.05, indicating that SFAS161-compliant hedgers reduced the amount of gain recognized in income 
by economic hedges by 50% in 2009.   
The results of the t- tests indicate that income statement earnings volatility is caused by economic hedges since there 
is no difference in the mean cash flow and fair value hedge ineffectiveness of SFAS161-compliant hedgers and 
SFAS161-accounting hedgers. The results are consistent with Nan (2007) which claims that SFAS 133 with the early 
recognition requirement intends to detain speculative activities through financial derivatives. The author argues that 
companies who are engaged in speculative activities through financial derivatives experience more volatile earnings 
“caused by the early recognition of unrealized gains/losses, while firms who effectively hedge through financial 
derivatives do not have this adverse effect in earnings” (p.14). Park’s (2004) tests of earnings volatility shows that 
the “three income-affecting sources (TIPs) (i.e., ineffective hedge gains/losses, gains/losses excluded in hedge 
assessment, and effects from cancelled forecasted transactions previously designed as cash flow hedges) arisen from 
SFAS 133 did not increase earnings volatility” (p. 15). 
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4.3 Multiple Regression Analysis 
Singh’s (2008) modified regression model is used to test the relationship of SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers’ and 
SFAS161- Compliant Hedgers’ hedging activities and earnings volatility. Using Singh’s (2008) regression model, the 
mean earnings volatility derived from BHCs derivative instruments designated as fair value hedges, cash flow 
hedges, and economic hedges  is regressed against  the corporate risk management control variables that proxy for 
the hedging incentives of the two groups. These control variables proxied for financial distress, managerial risk 
aversion, underinvestment costs, information asymmetry, and the regulatory capital adequacy of BHCs based on 
prior literature on theoretical corporate risk management (Adkins, Carter & Simpson, 2007; Boyabatli & Toktay, 
2004; Muller, Verschoor, 2008; Pai, Curcio & Thornton, 2006). Earnings volatility is measured by the coefficient of 
variation of earnings one year before and after the 2008 amendment of SFAS 133 following Bartons’ (2001), Barnes’ 
(2001), and Zhangs’ (2008) prior research. Zhang (2008) imposed eight quarters of non-missing data as the lowest 
possible data condition to lessen the noise in estimating earnings volatility. Laeven and Levine (2009) defined the 
coefficient of variation of earnings as the average standard deviation of the ratio of total earnings before taxes and 
loan loss provisions to average total assets. 
According to the extant accounting literature, the income statement effect of hedging activities under SFAS 133 
depends upon whether a derivative instrument has been designated as a fair value, cash flow hedge or economic 
hedge. If the derivative is designated as a fair value or cash flow hedge, only the ineffective portion of the hedging 
gains/losses is recognized in current earnings causing reluctant volatility, while for economic hedges both realized 
and unrealized gains and losses from changes in fair value of derivatives are recorded in earnings causing more 
volatile earnings. For highly effective hedges variations in the fair value of derivative instruments and the underlying 
hedged items mainly offset each other causing not material hedge ineffectiveness and leading to significant lower 
earnings volatility (Coughlan, 2003). To disentangle the effects of SFAS 133 on earnings volatility caused by 
economic or accounting hedges two control variables were added in the multiple regressions. These two control 
variables are HEDGEINF and NETGains (Losses). HEDGEINF measures BHCs value of cash flow and fair value 
cash ineffectiveness, while NETGains (Losses) measures both the realized and unrealized gains and losses due to 
changes in fair value of economic hedges recorded in earnings. 
The Multiple regression model below was used to test if the corporate risk management incentives of 
SFAS161-compliant hedgers and SFAS161-accounting hedgers to hedge using accounting vs. economic hedges 
significantly predicted any possible earnings volatility on their financial statements.  
EVolit =  β0 + β1Notionalit +β2ESmoothit +β3ESmooth1it +β4FINLEVit + β5CapAdeq1it +β6UNDERCit + 
β7INFOASYit + β8MNGRiskit + β9IRLibor + β10HEDGEINFit + β11NETGains (Losses) it + εit        (1) 
A definition of the variables utilized in this research is presented in Appendix A. 
Table 8 presents the multiple regression results of the Hypotheses. The results of the regression indicated that the 
combination of the variables explained 48% of the variance in earnings volatility for SFAS161-accounting hedgers 
(R2=.478, F (10, 27) =2.47, p<.005), while they explained 70% of the variance in earnings volatility for 
SFAS133-compliant hedgers (R2 =.678, F (10, 13) =2.74, p<.005). 
SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers. The regression was employed to help determine which of the eleven corporate-risk 
management hedging variables could be used to predict the Earnings Volatility of SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers one 
year after the amendment of the SFAS133. The variables produced a coefficient of determination R2 of .993 (F (10, 
27) = 3.00,p = .8) for the prediction of Earnings Volatility (EVol). The predictor with the lowest non-significant 
 =26) = 42.6, p = 1.37) was removed and the final 
regression analysis conducted had a coefficient of determination R2 of .478 (F (10, 27) = 2.47, p = .03), with four 
significant predictors of Earnings Volatility (EVol) -- ESmooth2, FINLEV, INFOASY, and MNGRisk. Together, 
these four predictors explained 48% of the variation in earnings volatility for SFAS133-accounting hedgers. The 
strongest predictor was INFOASY (p =.0063), followed by ESmooth2 (p = .0173), FINLEV (p = .0187), and 
MNGRisk (p =.0301).  INFOASY (β = 1.0937, t = 2.965) and ESmooth2 (β = 0.0487, t = 2.544) were both 
positively related to EVol, while FINLEV (β = -0.4758, t = -2.502) and MNGRisk (β = -3.5257, t = -2.289) were both 
negatively related to EVol. Finally, tests for multicollinearity indicated that a very low level of multicollinearity was 
present (VIF = 1.503 for INFOASY, 2.374 for ESmooth2, 1.513 for FINLEV, and 1.583 for MNGRisk). 
SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers. Multiple regression analysis was used to test if the corporate-risk management 
hedging variables significantly predicted the Earnings Volatility of SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers in 2009 one year 
after the amendment of SFAS133. The variables produced a coefficient of determination R2 of .695 (F (12, 11) = 
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2.09, p = .10) for the prediction of Earnings Volatility (EVol). The predictors with the highest VIF coefficients 
(HEDGEIN fair value, VIF=5.416 & NOTIONAL, VIF=5.068) were removed from the regression since a VIF value 
greater than 5 indicates that some degree of multicollinearity exists with respect to these two variables. The final 
regression analysis conducted had a coefficient of determination R2 of.678 (F (10, 13) = 2.74, p = .04), with two 
significant predictors of Earnings Volatility (EVol) -- INFOASY, and HEDGEIN cash flow. The predictors explained 
67% of the variation in earnings volatility for SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers. The strongest predictor was HEDGEIN 
cash flow (p = .0076) followed by INFOASY (p = .05). HEDGEIN cash flow (β = 0.6742, t = 3.156) and INFOASY 
(β = 1.8149, t = 2.063) were both positively related to EVol. Finally, tests for multicollinearity indicated that a very 
low level of multicollinearity was present for HEDGEIN cash flow (VIF = 1.605) and INFOASY (VIF=1.814) 
Table 8. Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Earnings Volatility 
NOTIONAL SFAS-133 
    ACCOUNTING HEDGERS   
SFAS-133 
    COMPLIANT HEDGERS   
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Variables 
 
NOTIONAL 
 
-1.2979 
 
1.2957 
 
-1.2979 
   
 
ESmooth 
 
-0.3641 
 
0.4876 
 
-0.3641 
 
0.1790 
 
0.1023 
 
0.6418 
 
ESmooth1 
 
0.1625 
 
0.1566 
 
0.1625 
 
0.2880 
 
0.4772 
 
0.6605 
 
FINLEV 
 
-0.4758 
 
0.1901 
 
-0.4758 
 
-0.1210 
 
0.2739 
 
-0.9018 
 
INFOASY 
 
1.0937 
 
0.3688 
 
1.0937 
 
0.0560 
 
0.2537 
 
0.6097 
 
UNDERC 
 
-0.0344 
 
0.3060 
 
-0.0344 
 
-0.2420 
 
0.3562 
 
-0.7080 
 
MNGRisk 
 
-0.3525 
 
1.5405 
 
-0.3525 
 
0.7180 
 
0.7216 
 
1.9351 
 
CapAdeq1 
 
0.1658 
 
0.1164 
 
0.1658 
 
-0.2890 
 
0.9756 
 
0.2015 
 
IRLIBOR 
 
-0.0136 
 
0.1258 
 
-0.0136 
 
-0.3800 
 
0.2103 
 
0.2153 
 
HEDGEIN cash flow 
 
0.2593 
 
0.2830 
 
0.2593 
 
0.6970 
 
0.1465 
 
0.7471 
 
HEDGEIN fair value 
   
 
0.2440 
 
0.2459 
 
1.3379 
 
NETGains(Losses) 
   
 
-0.069 
 
0.3927 
 
0.1245 
The multiple regression analysis shows that the most significant determinants for earnings volatility are information 
asymmetry for SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers and hedge ineffectiveness for SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers. SFAS 
133 vanguard increased earnings volatility for SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers since they engage in risk management 
strategies that are driven by both the economic and the accounting benefits of hedging. Although, firm valuations 
have traditionally been negatively related to earnings volatility, SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers should not worry that 
their stock price will be devalued because of the additional earnings volatility arising from economic hedges. Given 
hedging is uniform with a logical risk management  strategy that is clearly presented in the financial statements, 
investors and analysts have denoted that they will appraise companies based on an economic and not an accounting- 
driven analysis. The regression analysis results suggest that SFAS161- Accounting Hedgers converging exclusively 
on hedge accounting disregarding the economics of hedging will be viewed more inauspiciously by investors than 
SFAS161- Compliant Hedgers that focus on both the economics and the accounting of hedging. 
 Couglan (2003) suggested that SFAS 161-Accounting Hedgers converging exclusively on hedge accounting 
disregarding the economics of hedging will be viewed more inauspiciously by investors than SFAS161-Compliant 
Hedgers that focus on both the economics and the accounting of hedging. The author believes that BHCs should 
engage investors more on their risk management policy and demonstrate that their hedging strategy is effectively 
administered, examined, and managed, while Willis (2002) recommended that BHCs with increased earnings 
volatility should educate investors  about the causes by voluntarily disclosing in their financial statements additional 
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information regarding their hedging activities to assist analysts recognize the impact of economic hedges and 
accounting hedge ineffectiveness on earnings volatility. Panaretou, Shackleton, and Taylor (2009) argued that 
eminent “information regarding derivative instruments and hedges lessens the noise contained in earnings” (p. 6), 
reducing analysts’ forecasted errors and lowering the information asymmetry between analysts and BHCs. 
5. Conclusion 
This study suggest that apprehension of earnings volatility caused by economic hedges under SFAS 133, led 
SFAS161-Compliant Hedgers to adjust their hedging behavior to attain more desirable accounting results by 
drastically reducing the use of economic hedges and subsequently reducing the amount of gains (losses) recognized 
in income on derivative instruments designated as economic hedges. This is an implication that BHCs facing a 
trade-off between employing economic hedges which increase earnings volatility and discontinuing economic hedges 
to avoid increases in earnings volatility,  reciprocate between risk management and earnings volatility while 
suffering increases in market risk exposure (Kolbasovsky, 2009).Coughlan (2003) suggested that the implementation 
of hedging decisions should balance both economic and accounting performance. This translates into BHCs 
validating the economic benefits and parallel assessing whether or not a hedging instrument would qualify for SFAS 
161 hedge accounting. BHCs should consider the impact of economic hedges on earnings volatility alongside with 
the impact of hedging instruments that do or do not qualify for SFAS 161 hedge accounting. Campell et.al (2017) 
suggest that the enhanced mandatory derivative disclosures required by SFAS 161 improved investors’ understanding 
of the effects of derivative and hedging activities on future firm performance and firm value – and consequently 
mitigated investor mispricing. 
The results of this research accede with the results of Singh (2008), Park (2004), Zhang (2008), Hariom (2014), 
Bratten (2016), Spencer (2018), and Thomas (2018) who found that derivative users had lower levels of earnings 
volatility after the introduction of SFAS 161. Given that the major purpose of hedging is to shelter the income 
statement from variations in interest rates, foreign-exchange rates, or credit rates, SFAS161-Accounting Hedgers 
exercising derivatives for hedging reassessed their risk management approach to one that is more accounting 
responsive to ensure that most hedges are highly effective to qualify for hedge accounting. Hedge accounting reduces 
earnings volatility by minimizing the potential income statement effect of the risk that is being hedged since it causes 
the derivative gains or losses to influence earnings in the corresponding period as the gains or losses ensued from the 
risk being hedged.  
The alternative to hedge accounting that is applied to derivatives designated as economic hedges is to recognize 
variations in the recorded fair value of the derivative instrument immediately in earnings causing redundant volatility 
in earnings (Coughlan, 2003). Income statement earnings volatility is caused by either the cash flow or fair value 
hedge ineffectiveness of SFAS 133 accounting hedges or economic hedges according to the extant accounting 
literature (Nan, 2007; Park, 2004; Singh, 2008; Tromblem, 2003; Zhang, 2008; Hariom, 2014; Bratten, 2016; 
Spencer 2018; and Thomas, 2018). For SFAS 133 fully effective accounting hedges, changes in the fair value of the 
hedging instrument precisely offset changes in the fair value of the hedged item ascribed to the hedged risk and are 
realized in earnings in the same accounting period (SFAS 133, 2008, para. 18) protecting the income statement from 
the earnings volatility resulting from changes in the fair value of the derivative instrument (Tromblem, 2003), while 
any difference occurring from the gains/losses on the hedging instrument that do not offset the loss/gain on the 
hedged item ascribed to the hedged risk is the effect of hedge ineffectiveness and it is immediately recognized in 
earnings creating earnings volatility (SFAS 133, 2008, para. 21 & 22). 
This research compliments recent research by Hariom et al., (2014) and Campbell et all. , (2017) who showed that 
disclosure of firms’ accounting designation helps investors to better price derivative gains according to their 
underlying economic use. It is concluded that even when hedging relationships are highly-effective they still might 
not be perfect into offsetting changes in the fair value of the hedged item and the hedging instrument causing the 
ineffective portion of the change in the fair value of the hedging instrument to be recognized immediately in earnings 
causing earnings volatility. Although, SFAS’s 133 “principal purpose of providing special accounting for hedging 
activities is to mitigate the effects on earnings of different existing recognition and measurement attributes” (SFAS 
133, 2008, para. 366, p. 130), the approach of accelerating the earnings recognition of hedges that do not comply for 
hedge accounting reproduces unrepresentative earnings volatility. 
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Note 
Note 1. Under the "short cut" method, if a company meets certain strict criteria, it permits the user to assume no 
ineffectiveness and then ongoing effectiveness testing is not required. If those criteria are not met in their entirety, 
companies must use the "long haul" method, which requires extensive documentation, analysis and testing at inception 
and during the life of the hedge. Bank of America determined that certain hedges did not qualify for hedge accounting 
under the "short cut" method. As a result, any fluctuations in the market value of the derivatives should have been 
recorded through the income statement with no corresponding offset to the hedged item. While the management of 
Bank of America believes most of these hedges would have qualified for hedge accounting under the "long haul" 
method, that accounting cannot be applied retroactively. Consequently, the restatement assumes hedge accounting was 
not applicable to these derivatives and the related hedged item during the periods under review. Bank of America 
continues to manage its economic exposure to possible changes in interest rates and foreign exchange values. During 
the first quarter, Bank of America will ensure that the hedges affected by the restatement qualify for hedge accounting 
under SFAS 133. The company has determined that it had certain weaknesses in internal controls relating to hedge 
accounting under SFAS 133 and it has remedied them. Source: 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/bank-of-america-to-restate-financial-statements-for-accounting-
under-sfas-133-55395442.html 
 
Appendix A Variable Definition and Measurement 
Variable Construct Definition 
NOTIONAL Notional Value Aggregate total notional value of derivative contracts 
EVol Earnings Volatility The average standard deviation of the ratio of total earnings before income taxes and 
loan loss provisions to average total assets 
ESmooth Earnings Smoothing The ratio of loan loss provisions to net interest income 
ESmooth1 Earnings Smoothing  The ratio of the total notional value of derivatives used as hedging instruments 
divided by total assets 
FINLEV Financial Distress Tier 1 Leverage ratio defined as Tier 1 Capital divided by adjusted quarterly average 
total assets after certain adjustments 
INFOASY Information Asymmetry The logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm each year 
UNDERC Underinvestment Cost Market-to-book ratio computed as market value per share of common stock to book 
value per share 
MNGRisk Managerial Risk Aversion Ratio of CEOs stock option-based compensation relative to total compensation 
CapAdeq1 BHCs Capital Adequacy Tier 1 Capital which is Total Equity Capital minus (plus) accumulated net gains 
(losses) on cash flow hedges. 
IRLIBOR Interest Rate Coefficient The absolute value of the estimated coefficient from a regression of each BHCs 
monthly stock returns on the monthly percentage change in LIBOR 
HEDGEINFCASHFLOE Hedge Ineffectiveness Measures BHCs ineffective portion of the amount of gain (loss) recognized in 
income on derivatives designated as cash flow hedges 
HEDGEINFFAIRVALUE Hedge Ineffectiveness Measures BHCs ineffective portion of the amount of gain (loss) recognized in 
income on derivatives designated as fair value hedges 
ECOHEDGEGain 
(Loss) 
Economic Hedges Measures both realized and unrealized gains and losses recognized in income due to 
changes in fair value of derivatives designated as economic hedges 
OCI Net Gains(Losses) reclassified 
from OCI to Income 
OCI measures the net realized gains/losses reclassified from AOCI into income on 
derivatives designated as cash flow hedges 
 
